Competition compliance in digital markets has become a strategic business variable, and not merely a reflection of good corporate integrity practices. It must therefore be implemented from the creation of products, the definition of terms of use and data governance.
The Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Cade) has stepped up its scrutiny of unilateral and coordinated conduct in digital markets, opening at least 18 investigations since 2020, calling cases up to the Tribunal and entering into at least six Cease-and-Desist Commitments (TCCs). In the legislative sphere, Bill No. 4,675/2025 was introduced in response to the perception that traditional antitrust tools are insufficient to address some competition risks typical of these markets.
The Bill, which is being processed under urgency rules, proposes to impose specific obligations on agents of systemic relevance (gatekeepers) and to create a Digital Markets Superintendency within Cade, deepening the authority’s role in the digital context.
Despite this scenario, many compliance programs at digital companies remain anchored in “traditional” measures and topics for preventing competition risks, such as policies and training aimed only at preventing cartels, bid rigging and the exchange of sensitive information. These instruments remain relevant, but they do not capture new sources of risk typical of these markets, especially those associated with the way products, data and contractual relationships are structured.
Design as a risk vector
In digital markets, Cade has broadened its enforcement focus to the design of ecosystems, platform and privacy rules, the use of data and product architecture as potential vectors of restriction on competition. Recent cases indicate concern with practices that, although they do not entail the direct exclusion of market agents, may produce equivalent effects through access limitations, favoring of one’s own services (self preferencing), contractual conditions and the design of incentives.
Choices relating to platform design — access rules, default settings, ranking criteria, interoperability, product integration, data flows, restrictions on directing users to alternative channels (anti-steering), contractual incentives, and the use of algorithms and pre-defined applications or features (defaults) — have come to be analyzed as potential instruments of market foreclosure.
On the regulatory front, the Bill reinforces this agenda by proposing obligations for companies and their economic groups designated as gatekeepers, aimed at the transparency of terms of use and pricing structures, interoperability, portability and the prohibition of practices such as self-preferencing, tying and restrictions on user access.
Antitrust-by-Design
Unilateral conduct, such as exclusivity, self-preferencing and discrimination, is analyzed by Cade under the rule of reason, an effects-based standard of analysis. The mere practice of such conduct does not automatically constitute an infringement: to determine whether a practice is anticompetitive, Cade examines the relevant market affected, the existence of market power, the possible anticompetitive effects and any economic efficiencies.
In this context, compliance and legal professionals, and managers in user interface and user experience (UI/UX), product, digital advertising, privacy and ecosystems, will need to master the basic concepts of competition law. In companies with a significant market share and frequent product launches, it may be advisable to establish an internal body dedicated to analyzing competition risks.
Once markets in which the company holds market power have been identified, it is recommended to assess risks from the design of products and services onward: checking whether the product favors the company’s own services or reduces the visibility of rivals, whether there is tying or imposition of pre-installed products, whether there is retaliation against partners that use competing services, whether third-party data is used to compete with them, and whether there are exclusivity, parity or Most Favored Nation clauses.
It is recommended to document the pro-competitive justifications for design choices that may affect competitors, including security, privacy, fraud prevention and quality of the user experience. In addition to the analysis at the design stage, it is recommended to carry out periodic diagnostics of existing contractual relationships.
Coordinated conduct also calls for adjustments to compliance programs. Algorithmic pricing, for example, has been the subject of academic debate and investigations by competition authorities, as it may facilitate price fixing, hub-and-spoke cartels or the exchange of sensitive information among competitors.
The antitrust-by-design approach requires companies to incorporate competition analysis from the early stages of product development and business strategy. Companies operating in this segment should treat competition compliance as an integral part of product governance, and not as a separate control placed after the development of solutions.

